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I. INTRODUCTION
Beginning with the Sherman Act1 in 1890, and inferentially repeated
in the Clayton Act2 in 1914, the law has proscribed conspiracies which re-
strained trade or interstate commerce. Of course, to establish a conspiracy
under Section 1 of the Sherman Act, it has long been settled that it takes
two persons, as the action of one person alone is not sufficient.8 In order to
prove a violation of Section 2, it must be established that the defendant
achieved monopoly power or specifically intended to do so.4 These con-
cepts are basic prerequisites to an understanding of the law relating to the
intracorporate conspiracy problem.5
Initially, it should also be noted that, generally, the intracorporate con-
spiracy doctrine does not apply to concerted activity between officers or
employees of a single corporation.6  That would clearly abrogate any bene-
ficial competition otherwise engendered by the free enterprise system. But,
what if there is concerted activity between officers of one incorporated
* J.D., University of Notre Dame, 1969. Member, Bars of District of Columbia and State of
Iowa.
1 The Sherman Act was enacted in 1890 to help combat the giant trusts which were then
threatening to absorb the entire free enterprise system. E.g., Vukasin, The Anti-mnerger Law of
the United States: Yesterday, Today, Tomorrow (Part I), III ANITRUST BULL. 309, 311 (1958).
Section 1 of the Sherman Act provides in part
Section 1. Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or con-
spiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the Several States, or with foreign
nations is hereby declared to be illegal .... 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1964).
Section 2 of the Sherman Act proscribes monopolies via conspiracy.
Section 2. Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine
or conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or
commerce among the several states shall be guilty of a misdemeanor ... 15 U.S.C. §
2 (1964).
See, 15 U.S.C. § 14 (1964).
2 Section 3 of the Clayton Act has generally been considered capable of proscribing con-
spiracies, even in the area of "bathtub" conspiracies. Sheehy, Implications of Intra-Enterprise
Conspiracy Doctrine in Clayton Act Section 2 and 3 Cases, 8 A.B.A. ANTiTRUST SECrION 83
(1956); Willis & Pitofsky, Antitrust Consequences of Using Corporate Subsidiaries, 43 N.Y.U.L.
REV. 20,35 (1968); Danko v. Shell Oil Co., 115 F. Supp. 886 (E.D.N.Y. 1953).
3 See KINTNER, AN ANTITRUsT PRIMER 27 (1964).
4 Cf., Willis & Pitofsky, supra note 2, at 22; Kinmer, supra note 3, at 29.
5 "This concept is [also] often referred to as the 'intra-enterprise' or 'bathtub' conspiracy doc-
trine .... " Willis & Pitofsky, supra note 2, at 20. See also Handler, Some Misadventures in
Antitrust Policy Making-Nineteenth Annual Review, 76 YALE I-J. 92, 119-22 (1966); Sten-
gel, Intra-Enterprise Conspiracy Under Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 35 MIss. L.J. 5 (1963).
0 E.g., Kintner, supra note 3, at 29.
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subsidiary and officer's of an affiliated incorporated subsidiary? To carry
the problem one step further, what if there is concerted activity between
officers of one unincorporated division and officers of an affiliated unin-
corporated division? These two types of situations have been examined
under the anti-trust laws in recent decisions. This article will survey the
doctrine of the "bathtub" conspiracy, its effect on incorporated and unin-
corporated subsidiaries, and its prospective application, i.e., whether the
waters have settled but have left a tell-tale ring as an ominous warning for
the future.
II. THE "BATHTUB" CONSPIRACY DOCTRINE
In very early judicial times-even before the advent of antitrust law-
it was decided that the word "person" in the constitution included artificial
persons, i.e., corporations, as well as natural persons.7 Subsequent de-
velopments embellished the doctrine and held that corporations not only
could sue and be sued but also could conspire with each other' and, for a
time, even with its own officers.' The increased complexities of the com-
mercial market place engendered bigger and bigger corporations and the
rising intricacies of the law generated new plans and devices by the cor-
porations to ever improve their profit picture. One of the schemes with le-
gitimate tax and business reasons behind it'0 was the use of wholly-owned
incorporated subsidiaries." Perhaps the corporate counsel believed that
the antitrust laws would be no obstacle, under the theory that in eco-
nomic substance, the parent corporation and all the subsidiaries were acting
as one individual.'2 But their beliefs were shattered, for in this instance,
7 E.g., The Granger Cases, 94 U.S. 113 (1877); Minneapolis & St. Louis R. R. Co. v. Beck-
with, 129 U.S. 26 (1889); Sinking Fund Cases, 99 U.S. 700 (1878). See also HENN, CORPORA-
TION § 79 (1961).
8 E.g., U.S. v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Company, 310 U.S. 150 (1940); United States v. Trenton
Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392 (1927).
9 E.g., White Bear Theatre Corp. v. State Theatre Corp., 129 F.2d 600, 602 (8th Cir. 1942);
Patterson v. United States, 222 F. 599, 633 (6th Cit. 1915), cert. denied, 238 U.S. 635 (1915).
But this rule has been almost totally repudiated. Nelson Radio & Supply Co. v. Motorola, Inc.
200 F.2d 911 (5th Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 925 (1953); Chapman v. Rudd Paint &
Varnish Co., 409 F.2d 635, 643 n.9 (9th Cir. 1969); Goldlawr, Inc. v. Schubert, 276 F.2d 614,
617 (3rd Cir. 1960); Johnny Maddox Motor Co. v. Ford Motor Co., 202 F. Supp. 103, 105 (W.
D. Tex. 1960); Cotr Beverage Corp. v. Canada Dry Gingerale Ale, Inc., 146 F. Supp. 300 (S.D.
N.Y. 1956).
'o See Henn, supra note 7; Willis & Pitofsky, supra note 2.
11 Id. See also McQuade Conspiracy, Multicorporate Enterprises, and Section 1 of the Sher-
man Act, 41 VA. L. REv. 183, 184-88 (1955).
12 The theory of "piercing the corporate veil" had long been used to attack corporations.
See generally Henn, supra note 7, at §§ 143-52. It was, therefore, perhaps reasonable to as-
sume that the corporation could use this same theory as a defense to conspiracy allegations. This
proved to be a false assumption. E.g., United States v. General Motors Corp., 121 F.2d 376
(7th Cir.), cert. denied, 314 U.S. 614 (1941). See also McQuade, supra note 11, at 189-92. In
the General Motors case the court disregarded the fact that the individuals were individually in-
corporated. "It has been shown as a matter of law that the appellants are separate entities even
though as a matter of economics they may constitute a single integrated enterprise... 121
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the law insisted on adhering to the legal form of separately incorporated
subsidiaries. 13 It was this austere adherence to technical formality which
led to the formulation of the intracorporate or "bathtub" conspiracy doc-
trine, under which a parent corporation, in conjunction with a subsidiary
or one subsidiary in conjunction with another subsidiary, can conspire to
violate the antitrust laws. 14
The genesis of the "bathtub" conspiracy occurred in 1914 in United
States v. General Motors Corporation.15 General Motors Corporation and
three of its subsidiaries, General Motors Sales Corporation, General Motors
Acceptance Corporation, and General Motors Acceptance Corporation of
Indiana, were charged with conspiring to restrain trade in violation of the
Sherman Act.'6 The government alleged that those companies were collud-
ing against individual General Motors dealers to coerce them into financ-
ing their new car inventory, as well as the retail customer sales, through
General Motors Acceptance Corporation. The court initially noted that
two different products markets were involved: automobiles, in which the
consumer had a limited choice, and automobile financing, in which there
were 375 finance companies competing with General Motors Acceptance
Corporation.17 General Motors did not deny that the intracorporate agree-
ments had taken place, but they argued that all the subsidiaries and the par-
ent corporation were but one individual entity-i.e., a single trader-exer-
cising its privilege of refusing to deal.' The court rejected this theory
and, in doing so turned on the faucet of the "bathtub" conspiracy:
Nor can the appellants enjoy the benefits of separate corporate identity
and escape the consequences of an illegal combination in restraint of trade
F.2d at 410. In spite of these setbacks, commentators still urged that the true corporate picture
vas viewed through an economic lens, not a technical legal form:
"The corporation is emerging as an enterprise bounded by economics, rather than as an
artificial mystic personality bounded by forms of words in a charter, minute books, and
books of account. Berle, The Theory of Enterprise Entity, 47 COLUM. L. REV. 343,
345 (1947).
13 Se generally, McQuade, supra note 11, at 183.
14 See generally id.; Krause, The Afulti-Corporate International Business Under Section I of
o Shcrman Act - Intra.Enterprise Conspiracy Revisited, 17 Bus. I.Aw. 912 (1962); Willis
Pitofsky, supra note 2; McQuade, supra note 11; Stengel, supra note 5; Kempf, Bath Tub
nspiracies: Has Seagrams Distilled a fore Potent Brew? 24 Bus. LAW. 173 (1968).
15 121 F.2d 376 (7th Cir. 1914); cert. denied, 314 U.S. 618 (1914). Case Comments, 30
LiF. L REv. 204 (1942); 10 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 882 (1942); 27 MARQ. L. REV. 158
'43).
10 121 F.2d 376 (7th Cir. 1914); cert. denied, 314 U.S. 618 (1914).
371d. at 398-99.
181d. at 410. "GMC own[ed] 100 percent of the stock of GMAC and of GMSC. GMAC
[ed] 100 percent of the stock of GMAC, Indiana. The four corporations [had] interlocking
:torates, and they functionfed] as coordinated units of the large, decentralized scheme."
.uade, supra note 11, at 190. In his thorough book on the structure and history of General
)rs, Alfred P. Sloan discusses this case and notes that in 1952 the problem was finally termi-
I under a consent decree with the Justice Department by which GMAC would conduct "its
ess independently in competition with other financing organizations," A. SLOAN, MY
iS WITH GENERAL MOTORS 390 (MacFadden-Bartell ed. 1963).
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by insisting that they are in effect a single trade. The test of illegality under
the Sherman Act is not so much the particular form of business organiza-
tion effected, as it is the presence or absence of restraint of trade and
commerce. 19
Thus, the intracorporate conspiracy doctrine was inaugurated. The progeny
of General Motors only embellished what was stated therein. The rule
became established that "common ownership and control does not liberate
corporations from the impact of the antitrust laws. '20  The "bathtub" con-
spiracy doctrine has solidified and it is now "settled" that:
[Ilf a corporation chooses to conduct parts of its business through
subsidiary or affiliated corporations, and conspires with them to do some-
thing that independent entities cannot conspire to do under section 1 of
the Sherman Act, it is no defense that the corporations are, in reality, a
single economic entity.21
In spite of the settled state of the law, the implications and limits of the
law are not known.22  Moreover, the rise3 and fa1 24-temporarily ?25--
of the doctrine's application to unincorporated divisions or subsidiaries
makes it dear that the conspiracy waters are still polluted and that legal and
judicial discussion is necessary to dear the waters.
III. CONSPIRACY WITHIN INCORPORATED SUBSIDARIES
The cases following General Motors solidified the courts' position on
the application of antitrust conspiracy proscriptions to affiliated incorpor-
ated companies. The first decade following the incipiency of the "bathtub"
conspiracy doctrine saw litigation centered on related corporations who
were independently incorporated. Then, as now, many industries were
-9 121 F.2d 376,404 (7th Cir. 1914), cert. denied, 314 U.S. 618 (1914).
20 Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc., 340 U.S. 211, 215 (1951); see also
Fortner Enterprises, Inc. v. U.S. Steel Corporation, 394 U.S. 495 (1969); Parma Life Mufflers,
Inc. v. International Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134, 141-42 (1968); Timken Roller Bearing Co. v.
United States, 341 U.S. 543 (1951); Schine Chain Theatres, Inc. v. United States, 334 U.S. 110,
116 (1948).
21 Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc. v. Hawaiian Oke & Liquors, Ltd., 416 F.2d 71, 82 (9tb
Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1062 (1970).
22 Id. See also Handler, Through the Antitrst Looking Glass-Twenty-first Annual Anti
trust Review, 57 CALt. L. R.Ev. 182-93 (1969).
23 Hawaiian Oke & Liquors, Ltd. v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, 272 F. Supp. 915 (D. Hawai
1967), rev'd, 416 P.2d 71 (9th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396U.S. 1062 (1970).
24 Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc. v. Hawaiian Oke & Liquors, Ltd., 416 F.2d 71 (9th Ci
1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1062 (1970).
25 The author's basic thesis is a pessimistic one, i.e., that although the first attempt to app
the doctrine to unincorporated subsidiaries has failed, further attempts-perhaps relying on
de facto individual status of the unincorporated divisions within the corporate structure--
be made, and unfortunately perhaps, will ultimately be successful. It is this bad omen whi
the author believes will cause future protracted litigation and academic discussion. It is, perha
of no solace to the future legal jousters that the "'plain fact is that intracorporate [unincorp
ated] conspiracy makes absolutely no sense, legal or economic, and should be flatly repudiate
Handler, supra note 5, at 122.
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amenable to a separately incorporated, affiliated structure. The multicor-
porate form permits an increased managerial flexibility. This flexibility is
particularly advantageous to an organization which requires an efficient
localized form of management.2 6 In addition, an industry, by assuming a
multi-corporate form, would achieve those tax advantages which are tradi-
tionally attributed to operating a single economic enterprise through a
number of corporations:
I. Multiple surtax exemptions. The potential dollar savings resulting
from multiple surtax exemptions under [Internal Revenue Code] § I (c)
can be considerable. For example, if a business with taxable income of
$1,000,000 can effectively spread its income among 21 corporations, rather
than operating as a single corporation, the 20 additional surtax exemp-
tions can reduce tax liability by $130,000 at 1965 rates ....
2. Accumulated Earnings Credit. Another tax savings created by
multiple corporations is the reduction in exposure to the unreasonable
accumulations tax of [Internal Revenue Code] § 531 ....
3. Separate elections, accounting methods, and other similar "timing"
benefits. Another advantage of operating through multiple corporations
is the opportunity for various segments of business to adopt the account-
ing methods, periods, and elections (e.g., depreciation, inventory valuat-
ing bad debt, installment sale, & foreign tax credit elections) that are
most suitable to their needs.
4. Facilitating future sales of parts of the business. Initial establish-
ment of multiple corporate entities may provide greater flexibility at a
later date to divide up and sell off parts of the business without running
the gauntlet of such provisions as § 355 [corporate divisions], § 346 [par-
tial liquidations]. Tax planning looking toward the realization of accumu-
lated corporate earnings at capital gain rates can be greatly facilitated
through the multiple corporation device.27
It is in the context of the tax and other corporate advantages for multi-
incorporated subsidaries that the antitrust proscriptions must be considered. 8
Beginning with the General Motors decision, the courts have, in effect,
26 There are many other advantages to the multicorporate form, e.g., a more widespread
limited liability, savings on taxes, financial flexibility, and other advantages gained by local
laws of a given state. See Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 593, 603,
605-06 (1951) (concurring and dissenting opinions).
27 1Bin- & EusTIcE, FEDERAL INcOME TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS AND SHARE-
HOLDERS 670-71 (1966). See also McQuade, supra note 11, at 186. The advantages quoted in
the text relating to the use of multiple corporations vis-a-vis a single structural form are given
to explain an historical basis for the popular development of large corporations establishing in-
corporated subsidiaries. It was this development which laid a basis for antitrust problems.
It is beyond the scope of this article to estimate the clear and significant effect of the Tax Re-
form Act of 1969 (Pub. L. No. 91-172) [Dec. 30, 1969] on these factors.
The 1969 Act made a very significant change in the laws of multiple corporations.
Effective for years beginning after December 31, 1974, a parent-subsidiary or brother-
sister group is allowed only one $25,000 surtax exemption and only one $100,000
accumulated earnings tax credit. Levin, Corporation Adjustments, PRAcTISING LAW
INSTITUTE A PRACiONER'S GUIDE TO THE TAX REFORM AcT O 1969 25, 26-27
(1970). See INT. REV. CODE OF 1954 §§ 1561-1564, which were significantly
amended by § 401, Pub. L. No. 91-172 (Dec. 30, 1969).
2 8 Willis & Pitofsky, supra note 2.
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told corporations that if they wish to enjoy the corporate and tax benefits
of the multicorporate structure, they must also bear the burden of the
proscriptions of the antitrust laws. 29
In the "movie cases"2 0 the Government alleged violations of the Sher-
man Ace' in that chain motion picture distributors - independently in-
corporated, but a part of an integrated chain structure - conspired with
each other and used its aggregated power to bargain, if not coerce, film
distributors into granting them preferential terms in films and territories
and that the affiliated theater exhibitions were conspiring to extract mo-
nopoly rights. In United States v. Crescent Amusement Co.,2 the Supreme
Court stated: "The fact that the companies were affiliated induced joint
action and agreement. Common control was one of the instruments in
bringing about unity of purpose and unity of action and in making the
conspiracy effective."' 3 Four years later, in Schine Chain Theatres, Inc. v.
United States,34 the Supreme Court considered the concerted action among
the corporations, officers and directors within the Schine multicorporate
structure. The intra-enterprise conspiracy was bolstered in Schine, as the
court again expressed its view that the antitrust laws have full force and
effect on concerted action between affiliated corporations:
The concerted action of the parent company, its subsidiaries, and the named
officers and directors in that endeavor [extracting favorable film rental
termsl was a conspiracy which was not immunized by reason of the fact
that the members were closely affiliated rather than independent. 5
The theory of the Court in Schine was supported by its earlier decision
in United States v. Yellow Cab Co."' One Morris Markin was the head of
a pyramidical structure of several taxicab companies in Chicago, including
Chicago Yellow, Checker Cab Manufacturing Company and De Luxe. 7
In this case, the government alleged a conspiracy to restrain and monopo-
lize commerce. 8 The Court did not preclude every conspiracy within re-
lated corporations. It did, however, condemn a conspiracy in this situation
if the purpose of creating the affiliated corporations was to suppress or re-
strain commerce. 9 As the Court stated it, the argument of affiliated cor-
29 cf. id.
30 United States v. Crescent Amusement Co., 323 U.S. 173 (1944); United States v. Griffith,
334 U.S. 100 (1948); Schine Chain Theatres, Inc. v. United States, 334 U.S. 110 (1948).
31 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2 (1964).
32 323 U.S. 173 (1944).
831d. at 189.
34 334 U.S. 110 (1948).
35 Id. at 116.
36 332 U.S. 218 (1947). On retrial, Yellow Cab proved its contention that the affiliated
group was not established with the purpose of combining to restrain commerce. U.S. v. Yellow
Cab Co., 80 F. Supp. 926 (N.D. Ill. 1948), aI'd, 338 U.S. 338 (1949).
a7 332 U.S. at 220-22.
88id. at 220.
39 Id. at 227-28. See also Case Comment, 32 NMN. L REv. 521 (1948).
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porations is of no value if the incorporated subsidiaries were created jur-
suant to the conspiracy of restraint:
[T]he fact that the competition restrained is that between affiliated cor-
porations cannot serve to negative the statutory violation where, as here,
the affiliation is assertedly one of the means of effectuating the illegal con-
spiracy not be compete.40
The situation in Yellow Cab was the reverse of the traditional bathtub
conspiracy doctrine, for in Yellow Cab the affiliated subsidiaries were in-
corporated pursuant to the conspiracy, while in the normal intracorporate
conspiracy problem, the conspiracy arises after the establishment of the
multicorporate structure. 41
Although the concept of intra-enterprise conspiracy was spawned in the
General Motors case, it matured in the Kiefer-Stewart42 and Timken cases. 4
In Kiefer-Stewart, the Supreme Court considered the issue of intra-enterprise
conspiracies as applied to subsidiaries who were ostensibly in open compe-
tition with each other. The defendants all were separately incorporated,
but all were eventually controlled by Distiller's Corporation of Canada.44
DISTILLER'S CORPORATION OF CANADA 1I
SEAGRAMS, INDIANA
ISAGAM SALES G AL VERT
[CALVERT SALES
A liquor wholesaler, in a treble damage action, was awarded approximately
one million dollars. He charged that Calvert and Seagram conspired to
fx and maintain prices and to coerce compliance with those prices by in-
stantaneous cancellation of wholesalers' distributorships if the wholesaler
did not acquiesce. The defendants urged the same defense that had been
40 332 U.S. at 229.
41 See generally, Rahl, Conspiracy and the Antitrust Laws, 44 ILL. L. REv. 743, 764-65
(1950); McQuade, supra note 11, at 186. In this respect Yellow Cab is similar to United States
v. New York Great A&P Tea Co., Inc., 67 F. Supp. 626 (E.D. IlL. 1946), aff'd, 173 F.2d 79 (7th
Cir. 1949). For an interesting view of the pro and con criticism of this case, compare Dirlam
& Kahn, Antitrust Law & the Big Buyer: Another Look at the A&P Case, 60 J. POL. ECON. 118
(1952), with Adelman, The A&P Case: A Study in Applied Economic Theory, 63 Q.J. ECON.
238 (1949), and Adelman, Integration & Antitrust Policy, 63 HARV. L REV. 27 (1949).
4 2 Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, 340 U.S. 211 (1951). Case Comments,
12 Osno ST. L.J. 474 (1951); 24 S. CAL. L. REV. 507 (1951); 21 TENN. L REV. 881 (1951).
4 3 Timkin Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 593 (1951). Case Comment, 25
TEiP. L Q. 227 (1951).
44 340 U.S. 211, 229 (1951).
45Id. It is interesting to note that this company's troubles were not eradicated when they
abandoned the "incorporated" status of their subsidiaries. See text accompanying notes 60-79,
infra.
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argued in General Motors, i.e., that the entire organization was but a single
enterprise with a multicorporate merchandising structure. Mr. Justice
Black rejected this argument:
Respondents next suggest that their status as 'mere instrumentalities of a
single manufacturing-merchandizing unit' makes it impossible for them to
have conspired in a manner forbidden by the Sherman Act. But this
suggestion runs counter to our past decisions that common ownership
and control does not liberate corporations from the impact of the anti-
trust laws .... The rule is especially applicable where, as here, respond-
ents hold themselves out as competitors.46
The result of Kiefer-Stewart did not go uncriticized. But the judiciary
was not intimidated. Shortly thereafter the Supreme Court decided Timken
Roller Bearing Co. v. United States.4 8  In a civil action, the Government
had alleged that Timken Roller Bearing violated the Sherman Act by its
concerted action with French Timken and British Timken and that that con-
spiracy had as its object the restraint and elimination of competition. For
almost forty years prior to the institution of the suit, the defendants had
entered into certain agreements which set prices and divided market terri-
tory among the affiliated corporations. The facts of case established that
the American Timken company and British Timken had formed the French
company. The defendants argued that, in the overall picture, they were
but a single enterprise and that the agreements among themselves were
executed pursuant to the operation of their joint venture in France.49  The
Supreme Court rejected the defendants' contentions that their actions were
reasonable 0 and hence not violative of the Sherman Act.
The fact that there is common ownership or control of the contracting cor-
porations does not liberate them from the impact of the antitrust laws....
Nor do we find any support in reason or authority for the proposition that
agreements between legally separate persons and companies to suppress
competition among themselves and others can be justified by labeling the
project a "joint venture." Perhaps every agreement and combination to
restrain trade could be so labeled.5'
In dissenting, Mr. Justice Jackson argued that the decision placed too much
emphasis on the form. His conclusion was based on the Government's
view that if the affiliated corporations had not been incorporated, but were
merely divisions, there would be no antitrust violation. 2 The Government
46 340 U.S. at 215.
47 See, e.g., McQuade, supra note 11, at 207; Handler, supra note 2, at 119-22.
48341 U.S. 593 (1951).
49 Id. 598-600. See also, Krause, supra note 14, at 921. See also Note, Foreign Subsidiaries
in Antitrust Law, 4 STAN. L. REv. 559, 565-66 (1952); United States v. Imperial Chemical In-
dustries, 100 F. Supp. 504,592 (S.D.N.Y. 1951).
60 Cf. Standard Oil Company v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911).
58 341 U.S. at 598.
52 ld. at 606-07. This was also essentially the same position that the district judge took in
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had adopted the position that "parent and subsidiary corporations must ac-
cept the consequences of maintaining separate corporate entities. ' 5 3  The
dissenting judge warned the majority of the danger of establishing a law
of labels54
Thus, the Court applies the well-established conspiracy doctrine that what
it would not be illegal for Timken to do alone may be illegal as a con-
spiracy when done by two legally separate persons. The doctrine now ap-
plied to foreign commerce is that foreign subsidiaries organized by an
American corporation are "separate persons," and any arrangement between
them and the parent corporation to do that which is legal for the parent
alone is an unlawful conspiracy. I think that result places too much
weight on labels.55
The minimum impact of the Court's decision was that affiliated corporations
who outwardly act as if they are competitors incur the wrath of antitrust
law consequences50  The maximum impact is not yet determined. 7  Some-
where in between, however, the law has settled at least to the point that it
could be unequivocally stated that a corporation who has adopted the
multicorporate organizational structure runs the high risk of violating the
antitrust laws. If the affiliated parent and subsidiaries conspire among
themselves to a certain course of action - a concerted action which
independent corporations could not do without violating the Sherman Act
-the corporate units cannot defend themselves by arguing that, despite
the difference in form, in substance they are a single economic entity. The
view that "common ownership and control does not liberate corporations
from the impact of the antitrust laws"5" has solidified into a very perma-
nent judicial doctrine: 9 the parent corporation who has incorporated sub-
sidiaries must pay dose heed to the antitrust laws.
Hawaiian Oke & Liquors, Ltd. v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc., 272 F. Supp. 915 (D. Hawaii
1967), rev'd, 416 F.2d 71 (9th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1062 (1970). See note 86,
inra. See also U.S. v. Arnold Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365, 393 (1967) (concurring opinion).
53 341 U.S. at 607 (Mr. Justice Jackson, quoting the argument of the Government).
54 Apparently, at least one judge took the view that merely having the label of an unincor-
porated division did not immunize a corporation from the effects of the intra-enterprise conspiracy
doctrine, Hawaiian Oke & Liquors, Ltd. v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc., 272 F. Supp. 915 (D.
Hawaii 1967), rev'd, 416 F.2d 71 (9th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1062 (1970). See note
86, inIra.
r5 341 U.S. at 606-07 (dissenting opinion).
50 See Willis & Pitofsky, supra note 2, at 36-37, in which the authors speculate that the instant
result is aligned with earlier Federal Trade Commission cases, e.g., FTC v. Armour & Co., 1
F.T.C. 430 (1919); FTC v. A.A. Berry Seed Co., 2 F.T.C. 427 (1920); FTC v. Fleischmann Co.,
1 F.T.C. 119 (1918).
57 Handler, Through the Antitrust Looking Glass-Twenty-first Annual Antitrust Review,
57 CALI. L REv. 182 (1969).
58 Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc., 340 U.S. 211, 215 (1951).
G9 See, e.g., Former Enterprises, Inc. v. United States Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495, 507 (1969);
Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134, 141-42 (1968); Timken
Roller Bearing Co. v. United States 341 U.S. 593, 598 (1951).
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IV. CONSPIRACY WITHIN UNINCORPORATED DIVISIONS
For over twenty-five years from the inception of the doctrine, the "bath-
tub" conspiracy has been applied only to affiliated incorporated subsidiaries.
But in 1967, the traditional corporate and antitrust theories were abruptly
disturbed when a federal district court judge in Hawaiian Oke & Liquors
Ltd. v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons,60 held that unincorporated divisions of a
corporation were subject to the same intra-enterprise conspiracy doctrine
that had theretofore only been applied to separately incorporated subsid-
iaries. In Hawaiian Oke, the plaintiff had a wholesale liquor distributor
of various brands of Seagram-produced liquors; these included those sup-
plied to it by Calvert Distillers Company, Four Roses Distillers Company,
and Frankfurt Distillers Company, each of which was an unincorporated
division of House of Seagram which, in turn, was a wholly-owned subsid-
iary of Joseph E. Seagram & Sons. 1
Joseph E. Seagram & Sons
EThe House of Seagram, Inc.
Calvert Four Roses Frankfort
Distillers Distillers Distillers
Company Company Company
In 1965, each of those unincorporated divisions terminated its distributor-
ship contract with Hawaiian Oke. Each of the divisions decided to switch
to McKesson & Robbins, Inc., a diversified corporation that was engaged
in, among other things, the wholesale liquor distribution business. Hawai-
ian Oke filed suit under the Clayton 2 and Sherman Act6 3 to recover treble
damages for the injury which resulted to its business because of the al-
leged conspiracy among the divisions.
For the defendant Seagram, this action must have been a culmination of
60 272 F. Supp. 915 (D. Hawaii 1967), re'd, 416 F.2d 71 (9th Cir. 1969), cert. denied,
396 U.S. 1062 (1970). Case Comments, 6 DUQUESNE U. L REv. 157 (1968); 43 NomE DA E
LAw. 786 (1968); 36 FORDHAM L. REv. 607 (1968); 37 U. CIN. L. REv. 223 (1968); 21 VAND.
L. REV. 375 (1968); 43 N.Y.U. L REV. 172 (1968). Kempf, supra note 14; Willis & Pitofsky,
supra note 2, at 25-28; Handler, supra note 57 at 185-86.
61272 F. Supp. at 916, 920-24.
62 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1964). This is commonly referred to as Section 4 of the Clayton Act and
provides:
That any person who shall be injured in his business or property by reason of any-
thing forbidden in the antitrust laws may sue therefor in any district court of the United
States in the district in which the defendant resides, or is found, or has an agent, with-
out respect to the amount of controversy, and shall recover threefold the damages by
him sustained, and the cost of suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee.
63 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1964).
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frustration. In Kiefer-StewartG the Supreme Court had rejected Seagram's
contention that its incorporated subsidiaries were, in substance, one entity,
even though they were competing with each other. To avoid the effect of
that litigation,a the Seagram group underwent a corporate reorganization,
with each of the incorporated subsidiaries becoming divisions of a cor-
poration ultimately entitled The House of Seagram, Inc.66 According to
the testimony of Seagram's executive vice-president, the newly reorgan-
ized Seagram corporate structure was:
[Plretty well designed along the General Motors setup, where they are
independent sales divisions, in the sense that they compete, the same as
Pontiac competes against Buick and they both compete against Oldsmobile.
They are self-contained units. They have their own products. I think they
fight each other as hard as they fight anyone else.67
This testimony, in the light of earlier related Seagram litigation led the
district judge to conclude that unincorporated divisions who hold them-
selves out as independent competitors cannot avoid the impact of the
antitrust laws. The change in corporate structure, caused by Kiefer-Stewart
did not affect his conclusion:
Although Seagram changed the form of its corporate structure follow-
ing Kiefer-Stewart, there was no substantive change in the marketing tech-
nique employed.
There is nothing wrong with reorganizing to comply with court rul-
ings. However, to avoid the judicial proscription the reorganization must
be more than a shuffling of papers. Courts are concerned with applying
rules of law in an actual, factual context. Private parties cannot evade the
applicable law merely by changing the label attached to a particular busi-
ness entry.0 9
The district court then concluded that Seagram, having chosen the separate
and independent division as its form, could not avoid the impact of the
antitrust laws by pleading that they were mere unincorporated divisions.
Instead, the district court found that the divisions 'are each distinct and
separate, operating, marketing entities [and are] legally and factually
capable of entering into the conspiracy" 70 which had been alleged.
The result in Hawaiian Oke was a judicial bombshell which evoked
extensive legal commentary.71 The existence of this case as precedent
64 Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, 340 U.S. 211 (1951). See text accom-
panying notes 42-56, supra.
c5 272 F. Supp. at 920 n. 17.
6Od. at 920-21.
67 Id. at 922.
68 Id. at 924.
69 Id. at 921.
70 Id. at 924.
71 E.g., Burrus & Savarese, Developmeints in Antitrust During the Past Year, 37 ANnTRUsT
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would constitute a suspended weapon, capable of disrupting almost any
organization which had any internal division of sales, labor, or accounting.
Indeed, faithful adherence to this novel doctrine possibly would have
created the deus ex machina to be used in an ambitious assault on the Gen-
eral Motors corporate structure.72
The life of the intra-enterprise theory as applicable to unincorporated
divisions, however, was soon aborted. It never survived the appellate
process." The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the district court's
ruling in Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc. v. Hawaiian Oke & Liquors,
Ltd.74 Initially, the appellate court rejected the lower court's notation that
the Seagram corporate reorganization was a mere "shuffling of papers."
7 5
Before the 1959 reorganization, each subsidiary had its own payroll, ac-
counting department, billing, and each had limited liability. Consolida-
tion destroyed this limited liability, as well as certain tax advantages ....
The trial judge relied only on the fact that the divisions had autonomous
sales organizations . . ., thus in effect conceding that there was no auton-
omy in other respects. But since sales and price decisions are not made in
a vacuum, but are affected by other corporate activities, we doubt that auton-
omy in sales alone would ever be sufficient independence. 76
But what disturbed the ninth circuit more than the issue of whether the
corporate reorganization was meaningful or a mere paper shuffling exer-
cise, was the issue of whether - if the lower court's opinion was af-
firmed - there would be any judicial guidance upon which a corpora-
tion could rely and whether a corporation of any magnitude could validly
organize efficient subdivision of responsibility and still avoid the impact of
the antitrust laws.7 In other words, did the need for judicial certainty
outweigh the interest of antitrust law in proscribing conspiracies between
unincorporated divisions who openly compete with each other?
Once the theory that 'divisions' or other internal administrative units of a
single corporation can 'conspire' with each other is accepted, we can see no
sensible basis upon which it can be decided that, in one case, there has
been a conspiracy and that, in another, there has not. No corporation of
any size can operate without an internal division of labor between various
of its officers and agents . . . . Yet, under the trial court's ruling, the
L.J., 381, 384 (1968); Kempf, supra note 14; Handler, supra note 57 at 185-86; Willis &
Pitofsky, supra note 2. For a partial list of law reviews which commented on this case, see note
60, supra.
72 See text accompanying note 67, supra.
73 Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc. v. Hawaiian Oke & Liquors, Ltd., 416 F.2d 71 (9th Cir.
1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1062 (1970).
74 Id.
75 Id. at 83.
76 Id. See also Comment, Antitrust Law-Conspiracies-Unincorporated Divisions of a Sin-
gle Corporation Held Capable of Conspiring Under Section I of Sherman Act, 43 N.Y. U. L.
REV. 172, 177 (1968).
77 416 F.2d at 83-84.
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more delegation there is, the more danger there will be that holders of such
delegated authority will be found by a court to be capable of conspiring
with each other in carrying on the corporation's business .... 78
Accordingly, the Court concluded that if the doctrine-that unincorporated
divisions were capable of conspiring with each other-were accepted,
"there is no logical or practical way to avoid holding that all intra-corporate
agreements are or may be found to be conspiracies in restraint of trade."79
It appears that, for the time being, Seagram's corporate structure will re-
main undisturbed. It also appears that the "bathtub" conspiracy-as it
might relate to unincorporated divisions of a corporation-has no present
applicability. Accordingly, the ninth circuit, by its rejection, has caused
the apparent demise of what would have otherwise been a most contro-
versial doctrine which would cause widespread disagreement in its inter-
pretation and even more widespread confusion in its fair and practical
application to specific factual situations.
V. CONCLUSION
Reasonable men may differ as to their views on the prospective applica-
tion of the intra-enterprise conspiracy doctrine to unincorporated divi-
sions. In view of the ninth circuit's outright rejection of the applicability
of that doctrine to unincorporated divisions, many persons, perhaps, will
readily conclude that the issue is settled. Of course, others have always
believed that the intra-enterprise conspiracy doctrine had little or no merit,
even as applied to competing subsidiaries."
As a third alternative, it is submitted that resolution of the Hawaiian
Oke litigation might be one disposition of the "bathtub" conspiracy which
has left a tell-tale ring around the tub. Even though its application to
unincorporated divisions was rejected in this litigation, 81 it is more than
a fantasy to suggest that it will be resurrected at a later time. In Timken
Roller Bearing,82 Mr. Justice Jackson, in dissenting, observed that apply-
ing the "bathtub" conspiracy only to incorporated divisions "places too
much weight on labels."' 3 Even Milton Handler, a noted opponent of the
theory,84 admits that "antitrust law is concerned with substance and not
78Id. See also, Willis & Pitofsky, supra note 2, at 25-30; Handler, supra note 57, at 185-86;
Handler, supra note 5, at 119-22.
70416 F.2d at 84. See also McQuade, supra note 11, at 216; Willis & Pitofsky, supra note 2,
at 26; Rahl, Conspiracy and the Anti-trust Laws. 44 ILL. L.. REv. 743, 765-66 (1950).
80 "The plain fact is that intra-corporate conspiracy makes no sense, legal or economic, and
should be flatly repudiated." Handler, supra note 5, at 22. See also McQuade, supra note 11, at
214-16; Krause, supra note 14, at 936; Willis & Pitofsky, supra note 2, at 25-30.
81 Although the Supreme Court declined to review the case, Mr. Justices Black, Douglas, and
White were of the opinion that certiorari should have been granted. 396 U.S. 1062 (1970).
82341 U.S. 593 (1951).
83id. at 607. See text accompany note 55, supra.
84 Handler, supra note 5, at 121-22; Handler, supra note 57, at 185-86.
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mere form."85 When the district judge formulated the doctrine in Hawai-
ian Oke, he also recognized this: "There is nothing sacrosanct about the
'unincorporated' aspect of corporate divisions. To hold otherwise would
give businessmen the power to avoid the proscriptions of the antitrust
laws by the fortuitous employment of alert legal counsel. ' 86  It may well
be that some corporations prefer the incorporated subsidiary structure
while others prefer the unincorporated divisional structure.87 But the
ominous warning emerging from recent litigation is that the appellation
of a particular entity as an "unincorporated subsidiary" or an "unincor-
porated division" may be of little or no import.
Draftsmen may cast business arrangements in different legal molds for
purposes of commercial law, but these arrangements may operate identi-
cally in terms of economic function and competitive effect. It is the latter
factors which are the concern of the antitrust laws.88
In sum, while the ninth circuit and some commentators may believe that
the "bathtub" conspiracy, as applied to unincorporated divisions, has been
drained, it appears that it has left a tell-tale ring. The very real possibility
suggested by this omen-in the light of antitrust law's normal adherence
to substance, not form-is that it will gain new proponents. Perhaps when
the courts thoroughly examine the "bathtub" conspiracy, they will reach re-
sults on the basis of whether it is, in fact, a "separate business entity" and
not on the basis of whether the law has labeled it an incorporated sub-
sidiary or an unincorporated division.
85 Handler, supra note 5, at 122. See also Simpson v. Union Oil Co., 377 U.S. 13, 22 (1964).
86 272 F. Supp. 915, 920 (D. Hawaii 1967), rev'd, 416 F.2d 71 (9th Cir. 1969), cert. denied,
396 U.S. 1062 (1970). The lower court's opinion concentrated on a factual inquiry to determine
the separateness and independence of the sub-corporate entity-no matter whether it was incor-
porated or unincorporated.
Thus, whether a division is capable of conspiring depends on the peculiar facts dem-
onstrated. Is each facet of the unincorporated division's operation in fact, for all pur-
poses, controlled and directed from above, or is it endowed with separable, self-
generated and moving power to act in the pertinent area of economic activity? This
is the key question. If the division operates independently in directing the relevant
business activity, then it is a separate business entity under the antitrust laws. 272 F.
Supp. at 920.
See also Poller v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., 284 F.2d 599 (D.C. Cir. 1960) (dissenting
opinion), rev'd on other grounds 368 U.S. 464 (1962).
87 Cf. Willis & Pitofsky, supra note 2, at 26-28.
88 U.S. v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365, 393 (1967) (concurring opinion).
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